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Abstract
Conventional wisdom posits that high interest rates stem capital flight and currency depreciation.
Some have argued, however, that the standard prescription exacerbates the problem. This paper
set out a framework for evaluating the conditions under which an increase in domestic interest
rates fails to reverse capital outflow. The possibility that high domestic interest rates might have
unorthodox effects arises through a risk premium: If raising interest rates increases the
possibility associated with default, the result canbe a worsening of the country’s capital account
position.
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Inrecent financial crises around the world, episodes ofcapital flight and
currency depreciation have createddifficultpolicy choices for the governmentsof
affected nations. The standardpolicy prescription includes fiscal restraint and the
maintenance ofhigh domestic interest ratesto stem capital outflows. Although
countries which follow this advice arerewarded by the internationalcommunity with
financialassistance intended to furtherbuttress investorconfidence, the contractionary
effects ofthese policy prescriptions canbe bitter medicine.
In light ofthe continuing difficulties thatmany countries have faced following
the implementation ofsuchpolicies, some have arguedthat the standardprescription
exacerbatesproblems associated with capital flight. Forexample, Sachs (1998)
contends that by following theconventional wisdom to “raise interest rates to
stratospheric levels,” countries experiencea perverse outcome: “Investors do not gain
confidencewhen short-term rates arepushedto dozens ofpercent... The morethese
economies triedto defendtheircurrencies, the morethey incited panic.” The
implication ofthis argument is that higherrates can exacerbate problems associated
with currency depreciation and capital outflows.
Others aremore skeptical ofthis contention: “I have heard some peoplepropose
what amounts to a sort offoreignexchange-interest rateLaffer curve: if you cut interest
ratesthis willstrengthen the economy,and the currencywill actuallyrise. This is as
sillyas it sounds.”[Krugman (1998)J.
—1—This paper lays out a framework forevaluating theconditions under which an
increase in domestic interest rates failsto reversecapital outflows and support a country’s
exchange rate. That is, whenmight a “Laffer curve” typeofeffect be relevant?
This issue is examined in a simple model in which capital flows depend on an
interest arbitrage condition that incorporates a default risk. The possibility that high
domestic interest rates might have unorthodox effectson capital flows enters through the
risk premium: Ifraisinginterest rates increases the probability associated with a default on
outstanding debt, the resultcanbe a worseningofthe country’s capital account position.
Becausethe Laffercurve nature of the model admits the possibility ofmultiple
equilibria, an exogenous eventthat increases the perceived risk ofinvesting in a country
can result in ajump from an equilibrium in which raising interest rates will reverse
capital outflows, to one in which the reverse is true. A country facing capital flight due
to a crisisofconfidence might therefore be plunged into a situation in which reducing
interest ratesmight be the appropriate policy.
The Model
The model consists ofa small open economy in a world offree capital mobility.
To simplify the analysis, assume that the country’s net indebtedness is consolidated on
the accounts ofits government and denominated in terms ofa single fixed-return bond.
The nominal interest rate on the bond is the government’s singlepolicy instrument.
Investors consider both the explicit interest rate on the bond, R, and the probabilitythat
-2-the countrycontinuesto service its debt,p. The expectedreal return on the bond is therefore
r=pR+e (1)
where e is the expected rate ofcurrency appreciation. Returns are assumed to be zero in
the default state.
An interest arbitrage condition determines the direction ofcapital flows; i.e., an
investorwithdraws capital ifthe expectedreal returnon the country’s bonds falls below
the world real interest rate, rw. Ifwe assume that thereis a distribution ofbeliefs about
the default probability, the relationshipbetween capital flows and changes in thereturn
spread can be expressed as depending on changes in the expectations ofthe median
investor.
The possibility ofan anti-orthodox effect forhigh interest rate policies occurs
when theprobability ofa debtdefault is increasing in the country’s expected fiscal
deficit. Higher interest rates can increase prospective deficits in a number ofways. Most
directly, higher interest rates raise theburden ofdebt service obligations (particularly
whenoutstanding debt is already large). Higher rates also dampen investmentand overall
economic activity, and can debilitatea weak financial sector.
A full accounting ofall the possible effects set aside, let us assume that the
fundamental impactofhigh interest ratepolicies is to raisethe probabilitythat a country
will be unable to service its debt. Theprobability ofdefault might also be indirectly
affected by exchange ratedepreciation — especially to theextent that the county’s debt is
-3-denominated in foreign currency. Consequently, the probability that the countrywill
not default canbe expressed as
p=p(R,ejX) (2)
with ap( )/aR<0 and ap( )/ae>0. ThevectorXsummarizes the exogenous fundamentals
affecting investors’ risk assessments.
To the extent that a policy succeeds in raisingexpected real returns and
attracting capital, thecurrency will also appreciate. Moreover, high interest rates have





A policy ofraising interest rates will attract capital and appreciate a country’s
currency to the extent that expectedrealreturns rise. The possibility ofan anti-orthodox
outcome arises ifthe reverse is true; that is, if ar( )IaR<0. Combining equations (1), (2),
and (3) and differentiating, this condition is:
&PPR1~6R(l+Pe1?)<0 (4)
oR 1~Sr(1+PeR)
where subscripted terms denote absolute values ofpartial elasticities.
-4-Thedenominator ofthe expression in (4) capturesthe commonly-cited
vicious/virtuous circle offeedback between exchange rates and capital flows.’ For
example apolicy that lowers expected real returns and results in capital flight
depreciates a country’s currency, further increasing theprospect ofdefault and, hence,
lowering expected real returns.
Assumingthat this multiplier-effect is positive, inequality (4) is satisfied and the




An interest rate increase will be more likely to havethe anti-orthodox effectof
encouraging furthercapital outflows and currency depreciation if: (a.) the perceived
default probability atthe time ofthe policy change, l-p, is already high; (b.) the
sensitivityofexpected currencydepreciation to interest rate changes, 4, is low; (c.)
The sensitivity ofthe default probability to currency depreciation, Pe’ is low; and (d.)
interest rate increases have a substantial direct impacton the probability offuture
default (PR large). Factors (a.), (b.), and (c.) can be thoughtofasfacilitating conditions
forthe possibility that (d.) will dominate the effect ofchanges in the nominal interest
rate on expected realreturns.
Inequality (5) shows that it is feasible for the expected realreturn on a country’s
debt to be decreasing in the nominal interest rate over some ranges. Figure 1 illustrates
‘See, forexample, Corsetti, eta! (1998).
-5-an example ofthe relationshipbetweenthe explicit interest rateand expectedreal
returns — a “risky-return Laffercurve.” For interestrates lower than RL, the expected
realreturn liesbelow the worldreal interest rate. The country experiences capital
outflows, but these canbe eliminated by the conventional policy ofraising interest rates.
Further increases in the interest rateabove RL result in positive net capital flows.
Beyond the critical point RM, however, higher interest rates tendto decrease capital
inflows. Ifinterest rates areraised beyond R~, the country will experience capital
outflows, and efforts to reverse those flows by raising interest rates further will only
exacerbate the problem.
Theexistence oftwo points associated with zero netcapital flows in Figure 1
suggestsa possible sequence ofeventswhich couldresult in a country moving from one
equilibriumto another following an exogenous disturbance. Consider the situation
illustrated in Figure 2. Initially, the interest rate is R°which is associated with expected
real returns equal to theworld real interest rateand zeronet capital flows.
Suppose that an exogenous event causes investors to reassess theirevaluation of
the country’s default risk, loweringexpected returns and causing a capital outflow.2
The appropriate policy is to raise interest rates to R ~reestablishing equalityofexpected
returns. Lacking precise knowledge ofthe appropriatesize ofa rateincrease, however,
the government might takemore forceful action, raisingthe interest rate aboveR ‘~. If
thegovernment raises the interest as high as R h’ the capital outflow willbe unaffected
2The analysisof an increase in the world interest raterequires only slightmodification.
-6-and an evenmore aggressive interestrate increase worsensthe capital outflow. Fora
countrywith interest rateR~ the appropriate policy is to reduce the rate.
Discussion and Conclusions
The fundamental feature ofthemodel which makes the anti-orthodoxresult
possible is the hypothesized relationship betweenhigh interest rates and a greater
probability ofdefault. It is not at all surprising that forhigher rates to worsen capital
outflows, this relationship must be relatively strong. Incountries that areexperiencing
capital flight and currencydepreciation, it is likely that investors subjective beliefs
aboutthe probability ofdefault would, in fact, be quite sensitive to changes in
macroeconomic conditions.
Some oftheother features ofcondition (5)which make the anti-orthodox
outcome morelikely are similarlymorelikely to occur in countries experiencing
financial crisis. Forexample, the effectofhigher interest rates on expected inflation
and exchange rate depreciation is likely to be small in countries like Brazil, where the
exchange rate regime was creditedwith eliminating hyperinflation and where fears of
renewed inflation areunlikely to be calmed evenby thetightest monetary policies.
As a Laffer curvetype ofrelationship, themechanism describedin this note has
features in common with other similar analyses. Examples include models of
seigniorage like that ofBruno and Fischer (1995), and the“debt reliefLaffercurve”of
Krugman (1989). Like any suchanalysis, a theoretical frameworkhighlights only the
feasibility ofanti-orthodox outcomes, the question ofwhether or not itsuch outcomes
-7-areplausible is a measurementissue. While it is possible to speculate that someofthe
conditions implied by (5) are more likely to occur in countries experiencing fiscal or
balance ofpayments crises, an evaluation ofthe likelihood ofunconventional policy
outcomes depends crucially on measuringthe fundamental opposing forces near the
critical pointofthe Laffercurve. Hence,while the framework describedhere is
suggestive forthinking abouttheplausibility ofanti-orthodox outcomes, more definitive
measurementofthe relevant effectsis leftfor futureresearch.
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Figure 2: Responses to an Increase in Risk